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ABSTRACT 
 
Tax revenue is the main source of Indonesia’s revenue. On the other side, tax payer 
consider tax as an expense that should be minimized because it can reduce economic 
ability of companies. This is the reason why companies want to do same aggressive tax 
planning. The purpose of this research is to analyse the effect to executive compensation, 
CFOs female representation, institutional ownership, and firm size on tax aggressiveness. 
This research used 47 sample of manufacturing firms listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange with an observation period of 3 years so that the number of samples used in 
this study were 141 companies that acquired by purposive sampling method. The method 
of research analysis was used multiple regression analysis. The result of this research 
showed that simultaneously, executive compensation, CFOs female representation, 
institutional ownership, and firm size has significant effect on tax aggressiveness. 
Partially, executive compensation has significant effect on tax aggressiveness. While the 
CFOs female representation, institutional ownership, and firm size has no significant 
effect on tax aggressiveness. The results of this research conclude that executive 
compensation is one of effective to minimize tax expense. On the other way, it indicates 
the larger amount of executive compensation will increase the level of tax aggressiveness. 
 
Keywords: Executive compensation, CFOs female representation, institutional    
ownership, firm size, tax aggressiveness. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax as the largest source of state 
revenue from the non-oil and gas sector 
is the main source of national 
development that is continuously carried 
out by the state which aims to improve 
people's welfare. The source of funding 
from the tax sector is a manifestation of 
the country's independence in terms of 
development. The tax obtained by the 
state is managed and used for the benefit 
of the entire country and its people. But 
on the other hand, the company 
considers the tax imposed on the income 
they receive as an expense. 
The assumption that tax is a burden 
that will affect the profits available to be 
shared or reinvested makes the company 
feel it is important to carry out tax 
payment efficiency. The status of 
companies that go public or not will 
affect the dividend distribution policy. 
Companies that have gone public 
generally tend to be more high profile 
than companies that have not gone 
public. In order for its stock market 
prices to increase, company managers 
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who go public will try to look their best, 
succeed, and share large dividends. 
Likewise, the payment of taxes will be 
tried as well as possible. But whatever 
the assumption, economically tax is a 
profit deduction element that is available 
to be shared or reinvested by the 
company. In business practices, 
generally employers identify tax 
payments as a burden so that the 
company will try to maximize efficiency 
and competitiveness so managers must 
reduce costs as optimally as possible. 
Likewise with the obligation to pay 
taxes because the cost of taxes will 
affect the decline in profit after tax (after 
tax profit), the rate of return (rate of 
return), and cash flow (cash flows). The 
company conducts tax planning with the 
aim of minimizing tax payments that 
must be made by the company. To 
minimize the tax burden borne by the 
taxpayer, it can be reached by means of 
engineering which is still within the 
scope of taxation beyond the taxation 
provisions permitted by Law No. 36 of 
2008. 
    According to Rori (2013) tax 
planning is an effort to minimize taxes 
often referred to as tax planning 
techniques. Tax planning is a legal effort 
that can be utilized by the company. 
This action is legal because tax savings 
are only done by utilizing things that are 
not regulated in the provisions of 
taxation (loopholes). 
    According to Gunadi (2011) tax 
planning is a series of processes or 
actions carried out by taxpayers to 
engineer sources of income and 
expenses and other transactions with the 
aim of minimizing, deferring or 
eliminating tax burdens that are still 
within the regulatory framework. To 
achieve the intended purpose, employers 
must utilize all deductions, exceptions, 
exemptions, facilities and loans 
provided by the provisions and tax 
administration. If it is juxtaposed, 
avoidance involves mainly the 
commercialization and effective use of 
tax policies in legislation. Meanwhile, 
smuggling or tax evasion and the like 
(tax evasion) mainly occurs with 
disappearances or lack of reporting on 
tax objects which are sometimes 
supported by legal, accounting, and 
other administrative engineering. While 
tax aggressiveness is the act of 
manipulating taxable income made by 
companies through tax planning actions, 
both using methods that are classified as 
legal (tax avoidance) or illegal (tax 
evasion) (Frank et al., 2009). 
    Cases of tax avoidance in 
companies are motivated by the 
company's motivation to save taxes in 
order to avoid the tax burden that must 
be paid by the company. This is in 
accordance with the principles that are 
owned by the company, where the 
company strives to get the maximum 
profit by reducing the costs of the 
company including the cost of paying 
the tax burden, if necessary the 
company will eliminate costs to pay 
taxes. The act of tax aggressiveness can 
be an option for companies in their 
efforts to carry out tax avoidance. Tax 
aggressiveness can provide benefit 
margins and margin costs. The possible 
benefit margin is a tax saving that might 
be possible and have a significant 
impact on the company. Whereas the 
margin cost that might arise is the 
emergence of costs for the possibility of 
being subject to fines or tax penalties 
that arise when an inspection is carried 
out, a decline in share prices, and a loss 
of reputation. In this study, tax 
aggressiveness measures were measured 
using the Effective Tax Rate (ETR).  
     Compensation is an important 
component in creating an effective and 
conducive management. Compensation 
is part of management. A good 
compensation system can make a 
significant contribution to the goals to 
be achieved by the company, namely 
creating high profits. The compensation 
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system can help in strengthening the 
organization's key values as well as 
facilitating the achievement of 
organizational goals (Sutrisno, 2016). 
Thomson (2002) in Kadarisman (2012) 
suggests that compensation is an 
important factor that influences how 
and why people work in an organization 
and not work with other organizations.  
    The policy of determining 
executive compensation is one way that 
can be done in order to encourage an 
increase in manager's performance. 
Executives have an important duty to 
optimize company profits for both the 
owner of the company and for 
shareholders, and in return the 
executive will receive compensation in 
accordance with the performance of the 
executive. The owner of the company 
expects the executive to continue to 
improve its performance to achieve 
maximum profit by providing the right 
compensation policy. 
    The act of tax aggressiveness can 
arise from various factors, one of which 
is compensation. Management plays an 
important role in choosing a strategy 
that is carried out by the company to 
increase the shareholders' wealth. This is 
done by improving better and more 
efficient performance. One way that is 
done by management is by efficient tax 
payments. 
    Armstrong et al. (2011) 
conducted a study of the relationship of 
compensation received by company 
executives, especially tax directors, to 
corporate tax planning. In the study, 
they proved that there was a strong 
relationship between compensation 
received by executives and tax planning 
through the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
Effective Tax Rate. 
    In addition to compensation, tax 
aggressiveness can also arise from 
various other factors. According to 
Francis et al. (2014) conducted a study 
on the representation of women as Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) in American 
companies registered in the ExecuComp 
database against acts of tax 
aggressiveness. From the results of these 
studies there was no evidence that the 
representation of female CFOs was 
different from the behavior of male 
colleagues in the effort of tax 
aggressiveness (tax avoidance). In some 
sectors the CFO is also responsible for 
data analysis. 
    According to the research of 
Palvia et al. (2014) the behavior of each 
gender that is between women and men 
is proven through decisions made by 
directors which tend to influence the 
main strategies and financial decisions 
that will be made. According to Arun et 
al. (2015) in Oyenike et al. (2016), in 
general, women are more careful and do 
not want to accept large risks so that the 
gender of the company's directors is 
considered to influence company policy 
and company performance. Companies 
that have female directors have a lower 
level of earnings management. 
    According to Francis et al. 
(2014) gender differences in risk-taking 
behavior have been extensively 
investigated in the psychology and 
economic literature, the study assesses 
that women generally avoid risk more 
than men. Women are more obedient to 
rules and regulations. Some arguments 
suggest that women do not have 
different preferences than their male 
counterparts (Atkinson et al., 2011). 
Institutional ownership is ownership of 
shares owned by the government, 
foreign companies, foreign investors or 
banks (Dewi and Jati, 2014). Because of 
the company's responsibility to 
shareholders, institutional owners have 
incentives to ensure that company 
management makes decisions that will 
maximize shareholder welfare. 
Institutional ownership based on the 
amount of voting rights held can force 
managers to focus on economic 
performance and avoid opportunities for 
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selfish behavior. The results of the study 
by Khurana and Moser (2009) are the 
size of the concentration of institutional 
ownership will affect aggressive tax 
policy by the company. 
    The next factor that can 
influence tax avoidance activities is the 
size of the company. Total assets owned 
by the company can be used to 
determine the size of the company so 
that the greater the total assets owned by 
the company will also increase the 
amount of productivity of the company. 
This also has an impact on the 
company's profits that are increasing and 
affecting the level of tax payments. 
Rego and Wilson (2008) found in their 
research that the larger the company 
indicates that the transactions that occur 
are more complex. This resulted in the 
company taking advantage of the 
opportunities that exist in each of its 
transactions for tax avoidance efforts. 
    Based on this background, the 
research problems can be formulated as 
follows: 
1. Does executive compensation have a 
significant effect on the actions of tax  
    aggressiveness? 
2.  Does the representation of a female 
CFO have a significant effect on the 
actions of tax  
     aggressiveness? 
3. Does institutional ownership have a 
significant effect on the actions of tax 
aggressiveness? 
4. Does the size of the company have a 
significant effect on the actions of tax 
aggressiveness? 
5. Does executive compensation, 
representation of women's CFO, 
institutional ownership, and company 
size have a significant effect on the 
actions of tax aggressiveness? 
 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Tax Aggressiveness 
    Tax aggressiveness is an act of 
manipulating taxable income made by 
the company through tax planning 
actions, both using methods that are 
classified as legal (tax avoidance) or 
illegal (tax evasion) (Frank et al., 2009). 
Balakrishnan et al. (2011) states that 
companies that carry out tax 
aggressiveness actions can be shown 
with lower transparency. Furthermore, 
Chen et al. (2010) revealed that the 
company is assumed to have a 
preference so that company management 
becomes more aggressive in taxation. 
Although tax measures taken do not 
violate existing regulations, but 
companies are increasingly taking steps 
to avoid taxation by utilizing the gaps of 
existing regulations, the action is 
considered increasingly aggressive. The 
main objective of tax aggressiveness is 
to make the tax burden paid lower, 
because the company considers the 
payment of income tax as a very large 
additional expense or transfer of wealth 
from the company to the government 
which can reduce the company's profits, 
therefore the company is predicted to do 
actions that can reduce the company's 
tax burden. The level of tax 
aggressiveness is generally influenced 
by the benefits and risks that will be 
caused. Chen et al. (2010) in his 
research explained that when a company 
decides to take action on tax 
aggressiveness a manager or decision 
maker will make a calculation of 
benefits and losses with his decision. 
Aggressive tax actions can provide 
marginal benefits and marginal costs. 
Marginal benefits that may be obtained 
are: 
1. The efficiency of tax benefits paid by 
the company to the government, so 
that the benefits of cash for the 
owners or shareholders become 
wider. 
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2. Direct or indirect benefits for 
managers to obtain compensation 
from owners and shareholders from 
the actions of tax aggressiveness. 
3. Benefits of opportunities for 
managers to display rent extraction. 
Rent extraction is an act of managers 
who do not maximize the interests of 
the owner, this action can be in the 
form of preparation of aggressive 
financial statements, taking company 
resources or assets for personal gain, 
or conducting transactions with 
special parties. 
On the other hand, the marginal cost 
when carrying out tax aggressiveness is 
the possibility of obtaining sanctions or 
penalties from tax authorities and 
decreasing the company's stock price. 
The possibility of a decrease in stock 
prices is due to the assumption of 
shareholders that tax aggressiveness is 
carried out by managers for rent 
extraction actions that can harm 
shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2004). 
     Based on the above meanings, it can 
be concluded that aggressive tax actions 
are carried out as the last attempt of a 
series of tax planning behaviors for the 
purpose of reducing tax burdens and tax 
savings which can later produce 
aggressive tax reporting. In conducting 
aggressive tax actions, there are several 
advantages and disadvantages. Chen et 
al. (2010) mention three advantages of 
tax aggressiveness actions, namely: 
a.  Tax savings, so that the share of cash 
for shareholders becomes greater. 
b. Compensation for managers 
originating from shareholders on tax 
aggressiveness by the manager. 
c. The opportunity for managers to do 
rent extraction, namely the actions of 
managers who do not maximize the 
interests of the owner. This can be in 
the form of the preparation of 
aggressive financial reports, the 
extraction of company resources or 
assets for personal gain, or 
conducting transactions with parties 
that have special relationships. 
 
    Whereas Desai and Dharmapala 
(2004) mention 3 losses from aggressive 
tax actions, namely: 
a. There is a possibility that the 
company will be subject to penalties 
from tax authorities due to the 
discovery of frauds that may occur 
during the audit process 
b.  Damaged company reputation due to 
audits by tax authorities 
c. The decline in the company's stock 
price due to the assumption of 
shareholders that aggressive tax 
actions carried out by managers are 
rent extraction actions that can harm 
shareholders. In Indonesia in the 
current tax laws and regulations, 
there is no clear definition that 
regulates aggressive tax planning 
 
    Government efforts to maximize 
revenue from the tax sector often 
experience obstacles. One obstacle that 
must be faced by the government is tax 
avoidance and tax evasion or various 
policies implemented by companies to 
minimize the amount of tax paid by 
companies, one of which is to choose 
the right accounting method to reduce 
effective tax rate (ETR). Tax avoidance 
is a truly legal action (Zain, 2008). Tax 
avoidance is in no way against the law 
and can even obtain tax savings by 
exploiting the gaps in the tax 
regulations. While tax evasion is an 
effort to minimize tax payments, but this 
method is done by violating tax 
regulations. Using effective tax rates 
(ETR) can be categorized as a 
measurement of effective planning. 
    Corporate tax rates (effective tax rate 
/ ETR) are often used as one of the 
references by decision makers and 
interested parties to make policies 
within the company and include the 
conclusions of the taxation system in the 
company. According to Karayan and 
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Swenson (2007), one way to measure 
how well a company manages its tax is 
to look at its effective rates. 
    Based on the United States 
Government Accountability Office 
effective tax rate (ETR) is different from 
the applicable tax rate. Effective tax 
rates are used to measure taxes paid as a 
proportion of economic income, while 
the applicable tax rate shows the amount 
of tax liability relative to taxable 
income. 
 
2.2 Executive compensation 
    According to Siagian (1992) in 
Septyani (2013), the executive is 
someone who occupies a certain 
leadership position in an organization 
and has the rights and authority to move 
other people called "subordinates" and 
those subordinates who bear the 
responsibility of carrying out various 
operational activities in achieving goals 
organization. In other words, the 
executive is a top-level manager of an 
organization, which has a large 
influence on the company, such as the 
president director, vice president 
director, director, executive manager 
including the chief commissioner and 
commissioner. 
    The policy of determining executive 
compensation is one way that can be 
done in order to encourage increased 
performance. Executives are responsible 
for optimizing the profits of the owners 
or shareholders, and in return the 
executive will receive compensation in 
accordance with the contract. 
    According to Santi and Puji (2014) in 
Khasanah (2015) company owners 
expect the executive to improve 
performance with appropriate 
compensation policies. The executive 
compensation package basically 
contains almost the same as the 
employee compensation package in 
general, which consists of basic salary 
components, bonuses, incentives, 
facilities and benefits. The difference is 
the existence of a type of compensation 
in the form of stock options (Dessler, 
2007). Stock options (stock options) are 
rights to buy company shares at a certain 
price for a certain period of time, with 
the stock price below the market price 
and the price difference is a bonus 
(Sirait, 2007). 
According to Burchman and Jones 
(2006) a well-designed executive 
compensation program can spur the 
growth of company performance in two 
ways, namely: 
a.  Can help companies attract people 
who have the right talent in certain 
tasks and responsibilities to drive 
company growth. 
b.  Placement of a permanent leadership 
position. The draft compensation 
plan can strengthen growth strategies 
through measuring performance and 
specific objectives that affect the 
growth of the company and / or 
business units, while reducing the 
turnover of management caused by 
poor management performance 
because they are not satisfied with 
the compensation received. 
Some research on compensation is 
associated with agency theory. Agency 
theory views the relationship between 
the owner (principal) and company 
management (agent). The Principal 
trusts agents who provide managerial 
services. With this service, the agent 
receives compensation from the 
principal. Compensation is the value of 
services provided by company owners to 
management (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Armstrong et al. (2011) 
conducted a study of the relationship of 
compensation received by company 
executives, especially for compensation 
received by tax directors to corporate tax 
planning. In the study, they proved the 
existence of a strong relationship 
between compensation received by the 
company tax director and tax planning 
through the Effective GAAP Tax Rate. 
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    Rego and Wilson (2008) also found 
an association between CEO and CFO 
compensation for company aggressive 
tax actions associated with company 
performance. Desai and Dharmapala 
(2004) examined how equity-based 
compensation incentives affect tax 
hedge decisions. Because equity-based 
incentives must align managerial 
interests with shareholders. Desai and 
Dharmapala (2004) predict that these 
incentives must encourage managers to 
reduce lease transfers and increase their 
tax cover. However, Desai and 
Dharmapala also suspect that complex 
tax collection transactions designed to 
obscure the economic substance of 
transactions can also obscure the 
company's financial statements and 
increase opportunities for managerial 
diversion. Irawan and Farahmita (2012) 
also found that directors' compensation 
had an effect on corporate tax 
avoidance. However, these results 
contradict the research conducted by 
Putri (2014), and Dewi and Sari (2015), 
the results of the second study showed 
that executive compensation did not 
affect tax avoidance. 
 
2.3 Female CFO representation 
    Karam and Ballington (1999) in 
Woischnik (2012) say that the 
representation of women has a very 
important role, because it is believed to 
be able to provide positive change in a 
better policy-making process. The 
presence of women is a prerequisite for 
the realization of gender equality. 
    Parson and Bales (1955) in Partini 
(2013) reveal that women are more 
suitable for expressive work, while men 
are more suitable for instrumental work. 
Stoler (1982) and Boserup (1970) in 
Partini (2013) use the term domestic 
work for women and the public for men. 
Whereas Doringer and Piore (1971) and 
Stading (1978) in Partini (2013) refer to 
the term types of primary work for men, 
and secondary for women. Actually the 
division of labor sexually is not 
something that is wrong or wrong, 
provided that it can indicate the 
existence of balance (Budiman (1991) in 
Partini (2013)). The consequence of the 
division of labor is that women do not 
enter into the workforce, where there are 
differences in wages and opportunities 
(Carrel et al. (1995) in Partini (2013)). 
    Role theory pays attention to 
differences between sexes expressed 
through differences in expectations, 
attitudes, behaviors that have been 
patterned, and possible psychological 
characteristics. Men are considered to 
have higher intellect and emotions, and 
want meaningful work with greater 
expectations than women (Partini, 
2013). 
    Men monopolize managerial jobs a 
lot, men are developed in such a way as 
to exclude women from the preparation 
of various programs when companies 
must make important decisions (Reskin 
and Phipps (1988) in Partini (2013)). 
Work is becoming increasingly 
bureaucratic and various kinds of 
personal rules that deter women are also 
increasingly formalized (Taylor (1977) 
in Partini (2013)). Heterogeneous board 
of directors and commissioners of the 
company will be able to make decisions 
based on evaluations of several 
comparable alternatives with a more 
homogeneous board of directors. Female 
directors have different work experience 
compared to male directors. The director 
of women has a better understanding of 
the company's market segment 
compared to men and this can develop 
quality in the company's decision-
making process (Singh and Vinnicombe 
(2014) in Nathania (2014)). 
    Management diversity is an important 
thing to note regarding corporate 
governance in Indonesia because there is 
still an assumption that men are more 
eligible to occupy important positions in 
the company. Women's presence in the 
company is very beneficial for decision 
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making. For example, women's 
participation in corporate boards can 
help avoid projects that are too risky 
because women are generally more risk 
averse than men (Byrnes et al. (1999) in 
Nathania (2014)) and have a high level 
of caution ( Kusumastuti et al. (2007) in 
Nathania, 2014)). Second, men and 
women have cognitive differences 
(Hambrick and Mason (1984) in 
Nathania 2014)), women tend to have 
different norms, behaviors, beliefs, and 
perspectives (Pelled et al. (1999) in 
Nathania (2014)). This cognitive pattern 
will allow the board to consider broader 
choices and solutions related to 
company problems (Konrad et al. (2008) 
in Nathania (2014)). 
    Gender differences in risk taking 
behavior have been extensively explored 
in the fields of literature and literary 
economics. Existing studies show that 
women are generally more risk-averse 
than men (Francis et al., 2014). 
    Whereas Aspray and Cohoon (2009) 
in Arini et al. (2010) state that there is a 
relationship between gender roles and 
risk-taking behavior, namely feminine 
gender roles are more likely to produce 
higher risk-taking behavior.It is this 
gender role that influences people's 
views on the nature and behavior that 
should be displayed by certain sexes. 
Though it is uncertain that 
generalizations can be made to all 
people who have the same sex because 
everyone also has individual uniqueness 
(Hyde (2007) in Arini et al. (2010)). 
Although it can facilitate social 
categorization, there are also negative 
impacts of gender roles, namely 
attributive errors of aggressiveness and 
achievement. Men are seen as having a 
high level of aggressiveness when in 
fact not all men are like that. Women are 
always considered to have no desire for 
achievement, therefore there is a double 
standard for women, namely women 
must work extra hard to get success and 
gain recognition from the community 
(Hyde (2007) in Arini et al., (2010)). 
    Research conducted by Vermeir and 
Kenhove (2008) shows that women tend 
to be more ethical in making judgments 
and behavior than men. While Barber 
and Odean (2000) state that women tend 
to avoid risks compared to men.It can be 
said that gender differences from top 
management companies will influence 
decision making and direction of 
company policy. Associated with 
earnings management, gender 
differences from top management 
companies certainly can be assumed to 
have implications for earnings 
management practices and financial 
reporting quality. Peni and Vahaama 
(2010) state that the existence of one of 
the CEOs of women or a female CFO 
will reduce the level of earnings 
management. Whereas Baruan et al. 
(2010) in Francis et al. (2014) state that 
female CFOs have an influence on 
earnings management. 
    Meanwhile, Francis et al. (2014) do 
not determine that the representation of 
female samples as CFOs is different 
from the behavior of male colleagues in 
an effort to aggressively tax (tax 
avoidance). In other words, the 
representation of women as CFO does 
not significantly influence the actions of 
tax aggressiveness. 
 
2.4  Institutional Ownership 
    Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that 
institutional ownership has a very 
important role in minimizing agency 
conflicts that occur between managers 
and shareholders. The existence of 
institutional investors is considered 
capable of being an effective monitoring 
mechanism in every decision taken by 
the manager. This is because 
institutional investors are involved in 
strategic retrieval so it is not easy to 
believe in the act of profit manipulation. 
    Institutions can be foundations, banks, 
insurance companies, investment 
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companies, pension funds, companies in 
the form of companies (PT), and other 
institutions. The existence of 
institutional ownership in a company 
will encourage an increase in more 
optimal supervision of management 
performance. Supervision carried out by 
institutional investors is very dependent 
on the amount of investment made. 
Institutions that control shares are larger 
than other shareholders can supervise 
the management policies that are also 
greater so that management will avoid 
behavior that is detrimental to 
shareholders. The greater institutional 
ownership, the stronger control is 
exercised. 
    In Annisa and Lulus's (2012) study 
states that institutional owners play an 
important role in monitoring, 
disciplining and influencing managers. 
They argue that institutional owners 
should be based on the size and voting 
rights they have, which can force 
managers to focus on economic 
performance and avoid opportunities for 
selfish behavior. 
    The existence of corporate 
responsibility to the owner, the 
institutional owner has an incentive to 
ensure that management makes 
decisions that will maximize the welfare 
of shareholders. The existence of 
institutional investors also indicates 
pressure from investors to company 
management to carry out tax avoidance 
policies in order to obtain maximum 
profits for institutional investors (Dewi 
and Jati, 2014). 
    According to Fadhilah (2014) the size 
of the concentration of institutional 
ownership will affect aggressive tax 
policies, but the greater the institutional 
ownership will further reduce aggressive 
tax policy actions. 
    Research from Pranata et al. (2013) 
stated that the size of the concentration 
of institutional ownership would affect 
the aggressive tax policy by the 
company. Khurana and Moser (2009) 
also stated that the greater concentration 
of short-term shareholder institutions 
would increase aggressive tax policies, 
but the greater the concentration of 
ownership of long-term shareholder 
institutions would further reduce 
aggressive tax policy actions. Tax 
aggressiveness leads to tax savings that 
cause potential companies to be subject 
to sanctions by the IRS (Internal 
Revenue Service) related to 
implementation costs and agency costs. 
(Chen et al. (2008) in Annisa and Lulus 
(2012)). Companies with greater 
institutional ownership are more likely 
to issue, predict and predict something 
more specific, accurate, and optimistic 
(Khurana and Moser, 2009). 
    The greater the institutional 
ownership, the greater the supervision 
carried out by external parties. The 
company's management will carry out 
policies to optimize the value of the 
company so that the company's 
performance will increase. External 
shareholders have incentives to monitor 
and influence management fairly to 
protect their investment in the company. 
External shareholders reduce manager's 
opportunistic behavior, resulting in a 
low direct agency conflict between 
management and shareholders 
(Wahidahwati, 2002). 
 
2.5 Company Size 
    The size of the company is basically 
grouping into several groups, including 
large companies, medium-sized 
companies and small companies. 
Company scale is a measure used to 
reflect the size of the company based on 
the company's total assets. 
    According to Kieso (2014) the notion 
of assets is:"As a result of this event, it 
will be expected to flow to the entity." 
The statement above explains that assets 
are resources that are controlled by a 
company as a result of a past event and 
are expected to get future economic 
benefits for the company. 
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    According to Bestivano (2013) 
company size can be measured using the 
total assets, income or capital of the 
company. One benchmark that shows 
the size of the company is the size of the 
assets of the company. Companies that 
have a large total assets show that the 
company has reached maturity, where at 
this stage the company's cash flow has 
been positive and is considered to have 
good prospects in a relatively stable 
period and more able to generate profits 
than companies with small total assets. 
 
2.6. Hypothesis 
2.6.1 Effects of Executive 
Compensation on Actions of Tax 
Aggressiveness  
    Compensation is an important 
component in creating an effective and 
conducive management. Compensation 
is part of management. A good 
Compensation System can contribute 
significantly to business success. The 
compensation system helps in 
strengthening the organization's key 
values and facilitates the achievement of 
organizational goals (Sutrisno, 2016). 
    Thomson (2002) in Kadarisman 
(2012) suggests that compensation is an 
important factor that influences how and 
why people work in an organization and 
not other organizations. The policy of 
determining executive compensation is 
one way that can be done in order to 
encourage increased performance. 
    Rego and Wilson (2008) also found a 
relationship between CEO and CFO 
compensation for corporate tax 
aggressiveness associated with company 
performance. Then, Irawan and 
Farahmita (2012) also found that 
directors' compensation had an effect on 
corporate tax avoidance. Therefore, the 
hypothesis in this study is formulated as 
follows: 
Ha1: Executive compensation has a 
significant influence on the act of tax 
aggressiveness. 
2.6.2 Effect of Women's CFO 
Representation on Tax Aggression 
Actions 
    CFO is a position in a company that 
has the primary responsibility for 
managing the company's financial risk. 
In some sectors the CFO is also 
responsible for analyzing the data. In 
corporate financial reporting the CEO 
and CFO are the parties involved who 
directly sign the financial statements and 
are responsible for the information 
presented. 
   According to Aspray and Cohoon 
(2007) in Arini et al. (2010) state that 
there is a relationship between gender 
roles and risk-taking behavior, namely 
feminine gender roles are more likely to 
produce higher risk-taking behavior. 
Therefore, the hypothesis in this study is 
formulated as follows: 
Ha2: Representation of CFO for Women 
has a significant influence on the actions 
of tax aggressiveness. 
 
2.6.3 Effect of Institutional Ownership 
on Measures of Tax Aggressiveness 
    The existence of institutional 
investors is considered capable of being 
an effective monitoring mechanism in 
every decision taken by the manager. 
This is because institutional investors 
are involved in strategic retrieval so it is 
not easy to believe in the act of profit 
manipulation. The size of the 
concentration of institutional ownership 
will affect the policy of tax 
aggressiveness by the company. 
    In the research of Shleifer and 
Vishney (1986) in Annisa and Lulus 
(2012) states that institutional owners 
play an important role in monitoring, 
disciplining, and influencing 
management. Therefore the hypothesis 
is formulated as follows: 
Ha3: Institutional ownership has a 
significant influence on the act of tax 
aggressiveness. 
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2.6.4 Effect of Company Size on Tax 
Aggressiveness Measures 
    The size of the company is the scale 
that determines the size of the company 
that can be seen from equity, company 
value, number of employees and total 
asset value which is a context variable 
that measures the demands of service or 
product of the organization. Based on 
the research conducted by Swingly and 
Sukartha (2015) there is an influence 
between the size of the company and tax 
avoidance by the company. So based on 
the description above, the following 
hypotheses can be formulated: 
Ha4: Company size has a significant 
influence on tax aggressiveness. 
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
3.1. Population and sample 
    The data used in this study uses 
secondary data, namely in the form of 
financial statements from manufacturing 
companies that listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2014-2016 with a 
population of 149 companies 
    The criteria set by the author to take 
samples are as follows: 
1. Manufacturing companies 
consistently listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2014-
2016. 
2. Manufacturing companies that 
publish annual reports and financial 
statements in full from 2014-2016. 
3. Manufacturing companies that use the 
rupiah as a currency in their financial 
statements. 
4. Manufacturing companies that have 
not suffered losses during the period 
2014-2016. 
5. Manufacturing companies that have 
complete data related to the variables 
used in this study during the period 
2014-2016 
obtained a sample of 47 companies with 
an observation period of 3 years to 
obtain a sample of 141. 
 
3.2. Data Analysis Techniques 
The author tabulates the data by using 
Microsoft Excel to input and calculate 
the independent variables and dependent 
variables. After the data tabulation was 
done, the authors conducted descriptive 
statistical analysis, testing classical 
assumptions in the regression model and 
testing hypotheses using IBM SPSS 
Statistics 23. 
 
3.3. Operational Definitions of    
        Variables 
3.3.1  Independent variable 
a. Executive compensation 
Compensation is an important 
component in the creation of an 
effective and conducive 
management. Compensation is part 
of management. A good 
compensation system can contribute 
significantly to business success. The 
compensation system helps in 
strengthening the organization's key 
values and facilitates the 
achievement of organizational goals 
(Sutrisno, 2016). Compensation is a 
determinant of company policy 
decisions. In this study using a proxy 
carried out by Armstrong et al. 
(2011), which only tests the level of 
compensation given to the executive 
board. This study uses a proxy of 
natural logarithms from the total 
value of compensation received by 
directors and commissioners for one 
year (Putri, 2014). Executive board 
compensation data is contained in the 
disclosure of Notes to the Company's 
Financial Statements. 
b. Female CFO representation 
In this study the level of 
representation of women was 
measured by the representation of 
women as CFOs in the board of 
directors of a company. The CFO is 
responsible for managing the 
company's financial risk. The CFO is 
also responsible for financial 
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planning and recording, as well as 
financial reporting for higher 
management.In some sectors the 
CFO is also responsible for data 
analysis. This variable is proxied by 
a dummy variable, if the company 
has a female CFO rated 1 (one) and if 
it does not have a CFO, women are 
given a value of 0 (zero) (Francis et 
al., 2014). 
c. Institutional Ownership 
According to Ujiyantho and Pramuka 
(2007) institutional ownership is the 
proportion of share ownership by 
institutions such as NGOs, private 
companies, securities companies, 
pension funds, insurance companies, 
banks, and investment companies. 
Institutional ownership has an 
important role in monitoring, 
disciplining and influencing 
managers. They argue that 
institutional owners should be based 
on the size and voting rights they 
have, which can force managers to 
focus on economic performance and 
avoid opportunities for selfish 
behavior. Institutional ownership is 
measured by the number of 
institutional shares divided by the 
total outstanding shares. 
d. Company Size 
According to Bestivano (2013: 6) 
company size can be measured using 
the total assets, income or capital of 
the company. One benchmark that 
shows the size of the company is the 
size of the assets of the company. 
Companies that have large total 
assets show that the company has 
reached the maturity stage, where at 
this stage the company's cash flow is 
positive and is considered to have 
good prospects in a relatively stable 
period and more able to generate 
profits compared to companies with 
small total assets. Companies that 
have a large total assets show that the 
company has reached maturity, 
where at this stage the company's 
cash flow has been positive and is 
considered to have good prospects in 
a relatively stable period and more 
able to generate profits than 
companies with small total assets. 
Measurements can be made using the 
natural logarithmic formula of total 
assets. 
 
3.3.2 Dependent Variable 
    The dependent variable in this study 
is the act of tax aggressiveness. In this 
study, tax aggressiveness measures were 
measured using the Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR) in measuring the level of tax 
aggressiveness. Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR) is used as a measurement because 
it is considered to reflect a fixed 
difference between book profit 
calculation and fiscal profit (Frank et al, 
2009). Effective Tax Rate (ETR) is 
calculated by dividing the total 
corporate tax expense by profit before 
income tax. 
 
ETR  =   
 
The difference in ETR with the 
applicable tax rate can be seen as a form 
of tax avoidance but can also be seen as 
a form of tax planning carried out by the 
entity. If the ETR value is higher than 
the applicable tax rate, it can be said that 
there is no tax aggression and vice versa 
if the ETR value is lower than the 
applicable tax rate, it can be said that 
there is tax aggressiveness. According to 
Lestari et al. (2015) company effective 
tax rate (ETR) is often used as one of 
the references by decision makers and 
interested parties to make policies 
within the company and include tax 
system conclusions on the company. 
According to Karayan and Swenson 
(2007), one way to measure how well a 
company manages its tax is to look at its 
effective tax rate. The effectiveness of 
the company's efforts to minimize its tax 
burden is seen through the company's 
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effective tax rate (ETR). Basically, 
effective tax rate (ETR) is a comparison 
between tax obligations resulting from 
taxable income based on tax regulations, 
to the accounting lab based on 
accounting standards. 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Data Analysis Techniques 
    The author tabulates the data by using 
Microsoft Excel to input and calculate 
the independent variables and dependent 
variables. After the data tabulation was 
done, the authors conducted descriptive 
statistical analysis, testing classical 
assumptions in the regression model and 
testing hypotheses using IBM SPSS 
Statistics 23. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Results 
The results of multiple linear regression testing can be seen in table 4.1. 
Tabel  1 
Test Results for Multiple Linear Regression 
Coefficientsa  
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,365 ,063  
KOMP -,013 ,006 -,474 
CFO ,017 ,010 ,164 
KEPEMILIKAN 
INSTITUSIONAL 
,001 ,016 ,003 
SIZE ,007 ,005 ,302 
a. Dependent Variable: ETR   
Source: Data Processing Results with SPSS 23 (2017) 
 
From table 1, the regression equation 
can be made as follows: 
ETR = 0.365 - 0.013KOMP + 
0.017CFO + 0.001KEPINS + 
0.007SIZE + Ɛ 
 
Information: 
ETR = Effective Tax Rate 
KOMP = Executive Compensation 
CFO = Female CFO Representation 
KEPINS = Institutional Ownership 
SIZE = Company Size   
    The regression equation above shows 
a constant value of 0.365. This means 
that if the executive compensation 
variable, female CFO representation, 
institutional ownership and company 
size are considered constant or worth 0 
(zero), the Effective Tax Rate (ETR) 
will increase by 0.365 units or it can be 
said that tax aggressiveness will 
decrease by 0.365 units. 
    Regression coefficient value on 
executive compensation variable is -
0,013, this means that if the executive 
compensation variable increases by 1 
(one) unit then the ETR variable will 
decrease by -0,013 units assuming other 
variables are considered constant. The 
regression coefficient on the variable 
female CFO representation is 0.017, this 
means that if the variable representation 
of female CFO increases by 1 (one) unit 
then the ETR variable will increase by 
0.017 units, assuming other variables are 
considered constant. 
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Regression coefficient values on 
institutional ownership variables are 
0.001, this means that if institutional 
ownership variables increase by 1 (one) 
unit, the ETR variable will increase by 
0.001 units, assuming other variables are 
considered constant. 
    The regression coefficient on the 
variable size of the company is 0.007, 
this means that if the variable size of the 
company increases by 1 (one) unit then 
the ETR variable will increase by 0.007 
units, assuming other variables are 
considered constant. 
 
4.1.2 Determination Coefficient Test 
    The coefficient of determination in 
this study is based on the value of 
Adjusted R Square. The test results of 
the coefficient of determination can be 
seen in Table 4.2. 
 
 
Table 2 
Determination Coefficient Test Results 
Summaryb model 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE, KEPEMILIKAN INSTITUSIONAL, CFO, KOMP   
b. Dependent Variable: ETR   
Source: Data Processing Results with SPSS 23 (2017) 
 
    Based on the table above it is known 
that the Adjusted R Square value is 
0.049. This means that the independent 
variables used in this study, namely 
executive compensation, female CFO 
representation, institutional ownership, 
and company size can explain the 
dependent variable of 4.9% while the 
remainder is 95.1% (100% -4, 9%) are 
explained by other variables not 
examined in this study. 
 
 
 
 
4.1.3 Uji-t   
Tabel  3   
Hasil  Uji-t 
a.  Dependent Variable: ETR   
Source: Results of Data Processing with SPSS 23 
 
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,287a ,082 ,049 ,03890601 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,365 ,063  5,782 ,000 
KOMP -,013 ,006 -,474 -2,246 ,027 
CFO ,017 ,010 ,164 1,751 ,083 
KEPEMILIKAN 
INSTITUSIONAL 
,001 ,016 ,003 ,033 ,974 
SIZE ,007 ,005 ,302 1,426 ,157 
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4.1.4 Test F Statistics 
    To find out whether executive 
compensation, representation of 
women's CFO, institutional ownership 
and size of the company have an effect 
on simultaneously on tax 
aggressiveness, the F test is carried out. 
The F test results can be seen in Table 
4.4. 
 
Tabel  4.4 
F Test Results 
ANOVAa   
 
a. Dependent Variable: ETR   
b. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE, KEPEMILIKAN INSTITUSIONAL, CFO, 
KOMP  
Source: Data Processing Results with SPSS 23 (2017) 
 
4.2. Discussion 
4.2.1 Effects of Executive 
Compensation on Tax Aggressiveness 
Measures 
    Based on the results of the t test, it 
was found that the significance value of 
the executive compensation variable was 
0.027 <0.05 so that it could be 
concluded that executive compensation 
had a significant effect on tax 
aggressiveness or Ha1 was accepted. 
The regression coefficient value of the 
executive compensation variable of -
0.013 shows that the effect of executive 
compensation has a negative direction 
on ETR, so it can be concluded that the 
greater the amount of executive 
compensation, the lower the ETR value 
or the higher level of tax aggressiveness. 
    This study supports the results of 
research conducted by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2004), Rego and Wilson 
(2008), and Armstrong et al. (2011) who 
found that executive compensation 
proxied by natural logarithms from the 
total compensation received by the 
executive for one year affected tax 
aggressiveness. This indicates that 
compensation is one of the things that 
motivates corporate executives to take 
action on tax aggressiveness. The higher 
it is compensation then ETR decreases 
so that it indicates the existence of tax 
aggressiveness by the company. So that 
executive compensation that is right for 
executives is considered to be an 
effective way to achieve corporate tax 
efficiency efforts. 
4.2.2 Effect of Women's CFO 
Representation on Tax Aggression 
Actions 
    Based on the t test, it was found that 
the significance value of the variable 
female CFO representation was 0.083> 
0.05 so that it could be concluded that 
the representation of the female CFO 
had no significant effect on tax 
aggressiveness so Ha2 was rejected. 
These results support the results of the 
study of Francis et al. (2014). The 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
T Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) ,365 ,063  5,782 ,000 
KOMP -,013 ,006 -,474 -2,246 ,027 
CFO ,017 ,010 ,164 1,751 ,083 
KEPEMILIKAN 
INSTITUSIONAL 
,001 ,016 ,003 ,033 ,974 
SIZE ,007 ,005 ,302 1,426 ,157 
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limitations of the number of samples and 
years for the representation of female 
CFOs compared to the number of male 
CFOs in manufacturing companies in 
Indonesia for the 2014-2016 period were 
thought to be differences in results with 
previous studies. Another possibility, if 
previously the dependent variable tested 
was earnings management, this time the 
researcher tested the tax aggressiveness 
that had previously been done for 
American companies listed in the 
ExecuComp database (Francis et al. 
2014). Country differences and the 
number of samples also found mutually 
supportive results, that between female 
CFO representation and tax 
aggressiveness had no effect. This is due 
to the low opportunities women have 
and the assumption that women do not 
have the desire and ability to achieve, 
therefore women who get high positions 
will strive to achieve double standards, 
namely by gaining success and gaining 
recognition from the community. So that 
gender differences do not affect decision 
making, policy direction, consideration 
and risk. 
4.2.3 Effect of Institutional Ownership 
on Acts of Aggressiveness Tax 
    Based on the results of the t test, it 
was found that the significance value of 
institutional ownership variables was 
0.974> 0.05 so that it could be 
concluded that institutional ownership 
variables did not significantly influence 
the aggressiveness of the tax so that Ha3 
was rejected. These results support the 
research conducted by Annisa and Tulus 
(2012) where institutional ownership 
does not affect tax avoidance. This 
shows that institutional shareholders are 
not focused on the role of monitoring, 
disciplining and influencing 
management. This should force 
management to avoid selfish behavior, 
but institutional owners also have 
incentives to ensure that management 
makes decisions that can maximize the 
welfare of institutional shareholders. 
4.2.4 The Effect of Company Size on 
Tax Aggressiveness  
    Based on the results of the t test, it 
was found that the variable significance 
value of firm size was 0.157> 0.05 so it 
can be concluded that the variable size 
of the company did not significantly 
influence the aggressiveness of the tax 
so Ha4 was rejected. 
    The results of the study support the 
research conducted by Rusydi (2014). 
These results indicate that the size of the 
company does not affect the tax 
aggressiveness action, which means that 
the company's behavior to conduct tax 
aggressiveness is not influenced by the 
size of the company. The idea that tax is 
a burden, is currently still the main focus 
of the company so that tax 
aggressiveness becomes a strategy for 
all companies. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the research that has been 
done, the conclusions that can be given 
are as follows: 
1. Variable executive compensation has 
a significant positive effect on tax 
aggressiveness. This indicates that 
compensation is one of the things 
that motivates corporate executives 
to take action on tax aggressiveness. 
The higher the compensation, the 
ETR goes down so it indicates the 
higher the level of tax aggressiveness 
carried out by the company. So that 
executive compensation that is right 
for executives is considered to be an 
effective way to achieve corporate 
tax efficiency efforts. 
2. Variable representation of female 
CFO does not have a significant 
effect on tax aggressiveness. This is 
due to the low opportunities women 
have and the assumption that women 
do not have the desire and ability to 
achieve, therefore women who get 
high positions will strive to achieve 
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double standards, namely by gaining 
success and gaining recognition from 
the community. So that it can be 
concluded that gender differences do 
not affect decision making, policy 
direction, consideration and risk, 
related to tax planning strategies. 
3. Variable institutional ownership does 
not have a significant effect on tax 
aggressiveness. This indicates that 
the shareholders Institutions are less 
focused on the role of monitoring, 
disciplining and influencing 
management. 
4. Variable size of the company does not 
have a significant influence on tax 
aggressiveness. These results indicate 
that the size of the company does not 
affect the tax aggressiveness, which 
means that the company's behavior to 
carry out tax aggressiveness is not 
influenced by the size of the 
company. The idea that taxes are a 
burden, is currently still the main 
focus of entrepreneurs so that tax 
aggressiveness becomes a strategy 
for all companies regardless of the 
size of the company. 
5. Variables of executive compensation, 
representation of female CFO, 
institutional ownership and company 
size have a significant influence on 
tax aggressiveness. This indicates 
that the independent variables 
together have a simultaneous 
influence on the dependent variable. 
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